THE HEARING / CASE EVIDENCE

Historical source cards are paraphrases. Use the game for the interactive exhibit and hearing. Full citations and limitations are in Evidence_Source_Register.pdf.


RUSSIA

Presidential election on 15 to 17 March 2024

January to March 2024

Vladimir Putin remained president

Russia's president holds national executive office. Vladimir Putin sought another term in March 2024 and won. Some opponents tried to organize, monitor voting or protest. The file includes surveys reporting substantial support for Putin alongside evidence about entry to the contest. Investigate what challengers could realistically do, and distinguish evidence about people's reported attitudes from evidence about the opportunities available to political opponents.

How much could political opponents realistically challenge the president's hold on national office?

RU0  Reported attitudes after the election

Survey answer | Percent | Who answered

Said they voted for Putin | 80% | Respondents who said they voted

Reported no personal pressure to participate or choose a candidate | 94% | All respondents

Believed the election was fair | 78% | All respondents

Levada Center, 21-27 March 2024. In-person interviews with 1,628 adults. These are survey responses, not official vote returns. Each row has its own denominator. Source RU-D.

RU1 / One possible challenger could not enter

The election commission refused to register Boris Nadezhdin for the presidential ballot. Levada's February survey asked about that decision. In a January question that had included him among possible candidates, 3% of respondents selected him. The source reports limited recognition of Nadezhdin as well as his exclusion. A campaign with him on the ballot did not occur.

Source: RU-A  Levada Center, 2 May 2024; January and February surveys

RU2 / Organizers faced prison terms

Human Rights Watch documented extremism-related prosecutions of Alexei Navalny and people involved in his organizations. In 2023, courts sentenced Navalny to 19 years and former regional organizers to lengthy prison terms. HRW characterized these prosecutions as politically motivated. These events preceded the March 2024 presidential contest and affected people who had built opposition organizations.

Source: RU-B  HRW, World Report 2024, Russia, Counter-Extremism

RU3 / An observer mission could not deploy

On 29 January 2024, the OSCE's election-observation bodies said Russia had not invited them to monitor the presidential election. They therefore could not deploy a mission or provide their independent assessment of it. Their statement concerned a specific missing opportunity for independent observation.

Source: RU-C  OSCE/ODIHR and OSCE PA, 29 January 2024

RU4 / Many survey respondents described a fair vote

Levada conducted the RU0 survey shortly after the election. Among all respondents, 78% described the election as fair and 94% reported no personal pressure to participate or choose a candidate. Among self-reported voters, 80% said they chose Putin. Interviews took place in respondents' homes. The survey measured answers people gave in those circumstances.

Source: RU-D  Levada Center, 24 May 2024; fieldwork 21-27 March

RU5 / Protest and monitoring still occurred

Human Rights Watch reported police detentions during the March presidential vote over peaceful protest or election monitoring, citing the Russian rights monitor OVD-Info. People attempted these activities despite the risk of detention. The source documents attempts to act and the response to them.

Source: RU-E  HRW, World Report 2025, Russia, Freedom of Assembly

RU6 / Support also appeared before election day

In a separate survey of 1,601 adults on 21-28 February, 78% of all respondents said they would vote for Putin. Levada described this as a measure of sympathies at that moment, rather than an election forecast. This question concerned intended choice before voting. RU0 concerns recalled choice among people who said they voted.

Source: RU-F  Levada Center, 19 April 2024; February fieldwork


MALAYSIA

Elections to the lower house of parliament

2013 and May 2018, with a late 2018 epilogue

The governing BN coalition lost national power in 2018

Malaysia's lower house has 222 seats elected in local districts. Parties form coalitions to seek enough seats to govern. The Barisan Nasional coalition, or BN, kept power in 2013 under Prime Minister Najib Razak. In May 2018, the Pakatan Harapan alliance, or PH, won a majority. Investigate how substantial incumbent advantages coexisted with this change. The opposition alliances in 2013 and 2018 had different memberships.

What changed enough for challengers to defeat an advantaged incumbent?

MY0  Seats in the 222-member lower house

Political grouping | 2013 seats | 2018 seats

BN governing coalition | 133 | 79

Main opposition alliance | 89 (PR) | 113 (PH)

Other parties and independents | 0 | 30

A majority requires 112 of 222 seats. IPU PARLINE election records, MY-A and MY-B. PR and PH are different alliances. PH's 113 seats exclude Warisan's eight. The table records seats won in each election, rather than later party switching.

MY1 / A popular-vote majority did not produce power

IPU's record of the 2013 election reports that the opposition alliance received about 51% of the national popular vote. It won 89 seats, while BN won 133. The country used separate local district contests, not a national proportional allocation. BN therefore kept the parliamentary majority. A vote for a losing candidate did not contribute to electing a candidate in another district.

Source: MY-A  IPU, 2013 election; MY-F  IPU, Electoral system

MY2 / Critics faced specific legal pressures

Human Rights Watch's account of 2017 documented investigations and arrests for criticism on social media. Authorities also prosecuted the chief executive and editor-in-chief of Malaysiakini over a video criticizing the attorney general. The report described government powers over political-party registration. This evidence concerns restrictions before the 2018 election, rather than a measurement of how many votes those restrictions changed.

Source: MY-C  HRW, World Report 2018, Malaysia, Expression and Association

MY3 / The opposition gained an experienced insider

PH chose Mahathir Mohamad, a former long-serving prime minister, as its candidate to head the government in 2018. He campaigned against Najib, his former protege. Mahathir had previously led from within the incumbent political camp. His new alignment placed a politician with extensive governing experience on the opposition side.

Source: MY-B  IPU PARLINE, 2018 election, Background

MY4 / Campaign concerns included costs and the 1MDB controversy

IPU's contemporary account identifies anger over living costs and the 1MDB investment-fund scandal. In July 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice filed civil forfeiture complaints alleging that more than $3.5 billion had been misappropriated from 1MDB. This documents an enforcement action and allegations made before the election. The release does not measure voters' knowledge or choices.

Source: MY-B  IPU, Background; MY-D  U.S. DOJ, 20 July 2016

MY5 / Cooperation did not include every opponent

The 2013 opposition alliance later broke apart. The winning PH alliance in 2018 had a different membership. PAS, an opposition party outside PH, contested separately and won 18 seats. PH nevertheless secured 113 seats. The change involved a reorganization of cooperation, rather than every party opposing BN joining the same alliance.

Source: MY-B  IPU PARLINE, 2018 election, Background and results

MY6 / After turnover, reform still met resistance

Epilogue, after the election: the new lower-house majority passed a bill to repeal the Anti-Fake News Law in August 2018. The Senate, where allies of the former government remained influential, blocked it in September. Human Rights Watch also documented continued use of restrictive laws. These events occurred after PH's election victory.

Source: MY-E  HRW, World Report 2019, Malaysia, Freedom of Expression


MALAWI

Presidential election and court-ordered fresh election

May 2019 to June 2020

A declared incumbent victory gave way to a fresh election and an opposition victory

Malawi elects its president directly. The election commission declared sitting president Peter Mutharika the winner in May 2019. Opposition candidates Lazarus Chakwera and Saulos Chilima challenged the result. Courts ordered a fresh election, held in June 2020, which Chakwera won with Chilima as his running mate. Investigate two connected questions: how a new contest became possible, and why that contest produced a different winner.

How did the contest reopen, and what may explain its different winner? Choose one step to explain.

MW0  Candidate shares of valid presidential votes

Candidate | 2019 declared | 2020 reported

Peter Mutharika | 38.6% | 39.9%

Lazarus Chakwera | 35.4% | 59.3%

Saulos Chilima | 20.2% | Running mate to Chakwera

Other presidential candidates | 5.8% | 0.7%

Valid-vote shares rounded to one decimal. Sources MW-B p. 66, MW-C p. 42 and MW-E p. 233. Courts set aside the 2019 election; its declared figures do not reconstruct a fair count. Turnout among registered voters: 74.4% (2019), 64.8% (2020). Rounding can prevent totals adding to 100%.

MW1 / Government television favored the governing party

EU observers monitored broadcasting before the 2019 vote. State-owned MBC TV gave the governing DPP 87.6% of its monitored prime-time political-party airtime and the opposition MCP 6.6%. Several private broadcasters favored opposition parties. Observers also reported that campaign freedoms were generally respected. These percentages concern monitored content, rather than audience size or voter belief.

Source: MW-A  EU preliminary statement, 23 May 2019, pp. 1 and 9

MW2 / Separate challengers used the courts

Chakwera and Chilima ran separately in 2019 and each challenged the presidential result in court. Their cases were joined. The declared winner, Mutharika, had received the largest share of valid votes, but less than half. The election commission's later reports describe the petitions and the legal decisions that followed.

Source: MW-B  MEC 2019 report, pp. 66 and 72; MW-D pp. 59-60

MW3 / An order for a new contest survived appeal

On 3 February 2020, the court set aside the presidential election and ordered a fresh vote within 150 days. The commission's reports describe altered and incorrect result forms. Judges interpreted the constitution to require more than half of valid votes for a winner. Mutharika and the commission appealed; the Supreme Court upheld the central fresh-election requirement on 8 May.

Source: MW-B  MEC 2019, pp. 67, 72; MW-C  MEC 2020, pp. 11-12

MW4 / The second ballot offered different alliances

For the fresh election, Chakwera ran for president with Chilima as his running mate. Mutharika also chose a former separate candidate, Atupele Muluzi, as his new running mate. The presidential ballot contained three candidates rather than seven. Both the available alliances and the rule applied to determine the winner differed from the first contest.

Source: MW-B  MEC 2019 report, p. 66; MW-C pp. 28-29

MW5 / Organizations carried out the fresh election

Parliament set 23 June as the polling date. The election commission organized the vote. Its report says party representatives received polling-station result copies and that results were posted at polling stations. The Malawi Defence Force provided security while materials moved through the country. These are the election administrator's retrospective descriptions of implementation.

Source: MW-C  MEC 2020 report, pp. 10-12, 29 and 41

MW6 / A higher reported share still ended in defeat

Mutharika's valid-vote share rose from about 38.6% in the declared 2019 result to 39.9% in 2020, yet he lost the second contest. Chakwera now ran with Chilima, turnout fell, and the courts' majority rule applied. MEC publications put Chakwera at about 59.3%. The comparison contains several changes at once.

Source: MW-B  MEC 2019, p. 66; MW-C  2020 report, p. 42; MW-E p. 233


SERBIA

National parliamentary election on 17 December 2023

October 2023 to 6 February 2024

The incumbent-backed electoral list won a parliamentary majority

Serbia elects a 250-seat national parliament. The leading electoral list carried President Aleksandar Vucic's name and the backing of his Serbian Progressive Party, or SNS. Vucic was not himself a parliamentary candidate. Opposition parties formed the Serbia Against Violence alliance. The governing list won a majority. Investigate what political alternatives could accomplish, and how campaign conditions affected the options available to them. This file concerns the national contest, not simultaneous local races.

How could political alternatives remain active while the governing list retained an advantage?

RS0  Official parliamentary results reproduced by ODIHR

Electoral list | Share of all ballots cast | Seats / 250

Vucic / Serbia Must Not Stop (SNS-led) | 46.75% | 129

Serbia Against Violence | 23.66% | 65

Other lists combined | 26.86% | 56

Invalid ballots | 2.73% | None

RS-A, pp. 32-33. Total ballots cast: 3,815,007. Other/invalid percentages are calculated from counts and rounded. Other lists include governing allies as well as other parties. ODIHR reproduced the commission's figures; this was not a separate recount.

RS1 / The government presented a democratic rationale

On 30 October, the government asked the president to dissolve parliament. Its statement said early elections could reduce tensions, strengthen democracy and affirm free expression. It also cited opposition parties' request for elections. This source records the government's own public rationale before the campaign.

Source: RS-B  Government of Serbia, 30 October 2023, paragraphs 1-3

RS2 / Political alternatives could organize

ODIHR observers found genuine political alternatives and generally available freedoms of expression and assembly during campaigning. Opposition parties organized a large alliance. Vucic campaigned prominently for the governing list despite not being a parliamentary candidate.

Source: RS-A  ODIHR final report, 28 February 2024, pp. 5 and 13-14

RS3 / Television offered different kinds of access

ODIHR's television monitoring found positive presidential and governing-party coverage dominating ordinary news on national channels. Contestants also received separate campaign slots. Critical cable channel N1 and some newspapers offered different accounts. Monitoring measured content on selected outlets, rather than audience belief.

Source: RS-A  ODIHR final report, pp. 20-21; monitoring 21 Nov-14 Dec

RS4 / An investigation linked paid work and voting

A CINS journalist entered a campaign call-center recruitment process. In recorded exchanges, recruiters linked election-day work to voting for the governing party and requested a ballot photograph. The reporter received a day's cash payment after her shift was cancelled. This was firsthand journalistic investigation of a particular operation, rather than a national count of votes affected or a court conviction.

Source: RS-C  CINS, 29 November 2023, recruitment and payment sections

RS5 / Challenges continued after the result

Opposition protests and legal challenges followed the election. Authorities ordered repeat voting at some polling stations and rejected most challenges. The Constitutional Court had not ruled on annulment requests when the new parliament first met on 6 February. These actions did not produce national turnover in this window.

Source: RS-A  ODIHR final report, pp. 27-28

RS6 / Vote share and seat share used different rules

Serbia allocated parliamentary seats proportionally across a nationwide district, with a 3% threshold and special rules for national-minority lists. The SNS-led list won 129 of 250 seats. Lists below the threshold and allocation rules affect the translation of ballots into seats.

Source: RS-A  ODIHR final report, pp. 7 and 32-33